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Examining Warfare In Wi-Fi

Cyberwar to Wikiwar: Battles for Cyberspace
Paul Rexton Kan
Abstract: National leaders warn of a cyberwar and cyberterrorism that may lead to a potential “cyber Pearl Harbor.” To prevent
such an occurrence requires cyber defense or even some sort of
cyber deterrence. Some policymakers even want cyber arms control. However, these concepts are a retrofitting of those used in the
physical domain to describe violent acts and responses to them. Do
these concepts help policymakers, national security professionals,
and scholars understand aggressive acts perpetrated in cyberspace?

A

few days after the bombings at the Boston Marathon in April
2013, the Associated Press (AP) reported via Twitter, “Breaking:
Two Explosions in the White House and Barack Obama is
injured.” The Dow Jones Industrial lost nearly 150 points; $136 billion
of equity was suddenly gone. The AP’s Twitter account, whose feed had
been integrated into the reporting algorithms of the New York Stock
Exchange a few days prior, was hacked by a group calling itself the Syrian
Electronic Army, allowing it to tweet the fake message. Fortunately, the
loss in national wealth was short-lived as stocks recovered their value
within three minutes.
How do we place a context around what happened within those three
minutes? Was this a salvo in a cyberwar initiated by the Syrian regime or
a prank by an unaffiliated group for “lulz” (a corruption of “lol,” “laugh
out loud”)? There was no permanent loss of capital and aside from the
perpetrators, few would have actually laughed out loud. But there is still
a sense of seriousness about this episode that reveals the genuine limits
of our understanding of the cyber domain in the national security arena.
Given the newness of the digital domain, its man-made origins, and
its constantly changing nature due to manipulation by human beings,
it should not be surprising that national security professionals reach
for comfortable and familiar approaches. “Cyberattacks” are a daily,
or more accurately a nanosecond-after-nanosecond, occurrence that
requires “cyber security.” National leaders warn of a “cyberwar” and
“cyberterrorism” that may lead to a potential “cyber Pearl Harbor.” To
prevent such an occurrence requires “cyberdefense” or even some sort
of “cyberdeterrence.” Some policymakers want “cyber arms control”
to limit what types of cyberattacks can be perpetrated against another
country. These concepts are a retrofitting of those used in the physical
domain to describe violent acts and responses to them. Do these concepts help policymakers, national security professionals, and scholars
understand aggressive acts committed in cyberspace?
Richard Clarke in his book, Cyber War: The Next Threat to National
Security and What to Do About It, believes these concepts are not only relevant, but also consistently overlooked by policymakers. For Clarke, a
cyberwar refers “to actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s
computers or networks for the purpose of causing damage or disruption” (6). In his first chapter, he details “trial runs” which are incidents
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of cyberwar perpetrated most notably by
the Russians, North Koreans, and Israelis.
These episodes are now well-known—the
Israeli “owning” of Syria’s air defense
system in 2007; the suspected Russian distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks
against Estonia in 2007 and the more
sophisticated cyberattacks against Georgia
in 2008; and the North Korean botnet
attack against US websites in 2009. From
these episodes, he derives four maxims:
cyberwar is real; cyberwar happens at the
speed of light; cyberwar is global; and
cyberwar has begun. These maxims form
the core of his book as he presents more
accounts of the “cyberwarriors” in the
New York: HarperCollins, 2010. 320 pages.
$17.58.
“battlespace” and how the United States
should prepare, defend, and retaliate.
Clarke spends the majority of his time reemphasizing these maxims
throughout the book with brief examples. Clarke appears to be most
worried about China, which he argues is “systematically doing all the
things a nation would do if it contemplated having an offensive cyber
war capability and also thought that it might itself be targeted by cyber
war” (54). Clarke’s chief concern is that the United States is lagging far
behind countries like China. “Indeed, because of its greater dependence
on cyber-controlled systems and its inability thus far to create national
cyber defenses, the United States is currently far more vulnerable to
cyber war than Russia or China. The US is more at risk from cyber war
than are minor states like North Korea” (155).
Given the seriousness of Clarke’s assessment and the examples of
grave consequences of previous cyberattacks, his book deserves particular scrutiny. The narrowness of Clarke’s definition of what constitutes
a cyberwar is problematic. Do the myriad events he details really constitute “war”? Causing damage or disruption is a rather large range of
consequences—from defacing a website to crippling a power grid. In the
physical world, one act could be interpreted as vandalism and the other
may be viewed as malicious destruction of property. Without a coercive
intent to achieve a political goal, would the range of attacks—cyber or
otherwise—be considered an act of war?
This is where Thomas Rid’s, Cyber War Will Not Take Place, is especially useful in clearing up much conceptual fuzziness surrounding
cyberwar. In contrast to Clarke’s book, Rid’s is a more scholarly work.
Rid, a reader at King’s College in London, makes the argument that all
the disruptive acts perpetrated via cyberspace do not constitute war or
warfare, nor are they even particularly violent. “No cyber offense has
ever caused the loss of human life. No cyber offense has ever injured a
person. No cyber offense has ever seriously damaged a building” (166).
Taking Clausewitz’s theory of war, Rid argues “if the use of force in war
is violent, instrumental and political, then there is no cyber offense that
meets all three criteria. But more than that, there are very few cyber
attacks in history that meet only one of these criteria” (4, emphasis in
the original). For Rid, the events via cyberspace recounted by numerous
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national security professionals such as Clarke fall into one or more categories of espionage, sabotage, or subversion. “Despite the trends the
‘war’ in ‘cyber war’ ultimately has more in common with the war on
obesity than the Second World War—it has more metaphorical than
descriptive value” (9).
Rid’s point about being careful with metaphors and concepts in a
new domain is well taken. The goal of his book is “to attempt to help
consolidate the discussion, attenuate some of the hype and adequately
confront some of the most urgent security challenges” (ix). Much
thought has been brought to bear on the mechanics of nefarious acts
in cyberspace, but comparatively little time has been spent on putting
the acts into context. Understanding the motivations of groups and
individuals who act in cyberspace is essential. Rid’s main argument
and his subsequent chapters on “Violence,” “Sabotage,” “Espionage,”
and “Subversion” are powerful tonics to some of the more alarmist
literature on cyberwar. His conclusion is as interesting as it is provocative—cyberattacks are an attack on violence itself. Because activities
like sabotage, espionage, and subversion can now be accomplished in
cyberspace, fewer personnel are needed to conduct such activities in the
physical world. Where at one time special forces would have been sent
to destroy a facility, spies would have been dispatched to steal secrets
and mobs organized to protest government policies, cyberattacks can
now accomplish these goals simply and clandestinely. This conclusion,
however, needs to be treated with great caution. It is vaguely reminiscent
of early airpower theorists who predicted that the airplane would make
wars less violent by shortening their duration. Secondly, while cyberattacks may only indirectly create destruction or disruption in a targeted
nation, there may be direct costs to pay in the physical world. Digital acts
may be met with kinetic reprisals. Sabotage, espionage, and subversion
may not fit into the definition of war, but they have served as casus belli
for the outbreak of wars in the past.
Where Rid is helpful in clearing up the parameters of the discussion over cyberwar by focusing on stricter definitions, clearer concepts,
and more apt metaphors, he does not delve deeply enough into cyberattacks perpetrated by nonstate groups.
Rid’s chapter on “Subversion” only lightly
touches on the topic of nonstate groups
who use the digital domain to change the
behavior of states. These groups should not
be overlooked because another question
surrounding the fake AP tweet that sent
the stock market plunging is who exactly
is the Syrian Electronic Army? Is it a group
of a state-sponsored “patriotic hackers,” an
unaffiliated association, a loose assemblage
of individuals sympathetic to the regime
of Bashar Assad, or some combination of
each? With the anonymity that cyberspace
affords, both Clarke and Rid agree that
the problem of attribution is difficult. If
the Syrian Electronic Army is an unaffiliC. Hurst & Company Publishers,
ated collective of some kind, the cyberwar London:
2013. 256 pages. $27.95.
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debate fails to capture the significance of its activities. Cyberwar between
countries does not occupy all the space in the debate, much like interstate
war does not cover all aspects of war. Dispersed groups of hacktivists
engage in many of the same damaging cyber activities as nation-states.
This demonstrates a uniqueness of the cyber domain. Due to the ease
of entry into cyberspace, hacktivists have committed the same online
acts like defacing websites, stealing proprietary information, DDOS
attacks, and launching botnets that are in the repertoire of cyberattacks
conducted by countries. As a result, hacktivists have much the same
power in cyberspace as the infamous Chinese hackers of the People’s
Liberation Army. But unlike countries that launch cyberattacks for
political reasons linked to foreign policy, hacktivists use the Internet to
advance political and social goals that center around the Internet itself.
Groups like Anonymous and WikiLeaks
see themselves as combatants in a war to
achieve the goal of Internet freedom. For
them, human liberation begins with the liberation of information. In Julian Assange’s
book, Cypherpunks: Freedom and the Future of
Internet, this belief comes into sharp focus.
The book takes its name from the cypherpunks movement that emerged in the late
1980s; it believed in the widespread use
and availability of cryptography to protect
and foster human liberty against intrusive
state surveillance. The book is a compilation of discussions of fellow believers in
the cypherpunks’ slogan of “privacy for the
New York: OR Books, 2012. 186 pages.
weak, transparency for the powerful.” The
$9.99.
discussions occurred with Assange, the
founder of WikiLeaks, while he was under house arrest in the United
Kingdom awaiting extradition to Sweden, but before he sought asylum
at the Ecuadorean Embassy in London where he continues to reside. The
conversations reveal how the group sees itself as engaged in a violent
struggle against what it views as the “coming surveillance dystopia”
organized by countries and powerful corporations. They argue they and
their fellow believers have “had conflicts with nearly every powerful
state. . . . We know it from a combatant’s perspective, because we have
had to protect our people, our finances and our sources from [them].”
But it is not only countries that are the subject of the discussions.
Google is the subject of the chapter, “Private Sector Spying.” There is a
typical but thought-provoking exchange between two group members:
Jeremie: State-sponsored surveillance is indeed a major issue which challenges the very structure of all democracies and the way they function, but
there is also private surveillance and potentially private mass collection of
data. Just look at Google. If you’re a standard Google user Google knows
who you’re communicating with, who you know, what you’re researching,
potentially your sexual orientation, and your religious and philosophical
beliefs.
Andy: It knows more about you than you know yourself.
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Jeremie: More than your mother and maybe more than yourself. Google
knows when you’re online and when you’re not.
Andy: Do you know what you looked for two years, three days and four
hours ago? You don’t know; Google knows.

The rhetoric of the conversations can be overly dramatic; labels like
“Nazi youth camp” and “Stasi acts” are bandied about without care.
The chapter on “The Militarization of Cyberspace” begins with Assange
arguing that all communications linked to the Internet are monitored
by military intelligence organizations. “It’s like having a tank in your
bedroom. It’s a soldier between you and your wife as you’re [texting].
We are all living under martial law as far as our communications are
concerned; we just can’t see the tanks” (33). For many, the group’s
constant use of metaphors, analogies, and rhetoric of war will be offputting. However, it is important to wade through and come to grips
with the implications of their arguments rather than get bogged down
in their use (or abuse) of language. Most problematic is its ideology of
Internet freedom. An ideology centered around the free use of technology becomes ironic, especially in the case of the Syrian Electronic
Army. It is unclear whether the group of cypherpunks would approve
of another hacktivist group’s online activities done in the name of a
tyrannical regime in Damascus, a regime that has used an Internet “kill
switch” to stop Internet traffic out of it borders. Yet, if the Internet were
entirely “liberated,” the activities of the Syrian Electronic Army would
be permitted if perpetrated against a surveillance state like the United
States. In short, not all hacktivism serves human liberation; it can cut
both ways. To paraphrase one technology observer, Farhad Manjoo, the
Internet is just a series of tubes without ideology.
While Cypherpunks lays out the ideology
as espoused by a core group of hacktivists,
Parmy Olson’s book, We are Anonymous: Inside
the Hacker World of LulzSec, Anonymous and the
Global Cyber Insurgency, is a richly detailed,
journalistic account of the history and acts
of a cyber group that pushes this ideology
forward with its cyberattacks. Unlike the
inner circle of WikiLeaks, Olson’s book
chronicles the rise of a hacktivist collective that is now more like a social cyber
movement. One of the most important
observations by Olson is the misconception that Anonymous is a “small clique of
super hackers.” In fact, only a few in the
collective were hackers and the rest were
“simply young internet users who felt like New York: Back Bay Books, 2012. 528
doing something other than wasting time pages. $16.00.
[in anonymous chat forums]” (81). The rallying cry for Anonymous mirrored that of the cypherpunks, “information wants to be free.”
If Russian attacks against Estonia and Georgia are the sine qua non
of cyber war in the interstate realm, the attacks by Anonymous against
the Church of Scientology, PayPal, and Sony are the sine qua non of
hacktivism in the hacking world. Olson details how Anonymous gained
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notoriety for its 2008 operations against the Church of Scientology. In
that year, the church pressured YouTube to remove a leaked video of
church member and actor Tom Cruise. Such pressure exerted by the
Church of Scientology ran counter to the Anonymous ethos of transparency. In response, Anonymous launched an operation to bring down
the church’s website that combined DDOS attacks with pranks such
as phone calls with repetitive music, constant faxing of black paper to
drain printer cartridges, and ordering unwanted pizza deliveries and taxi
service. The group has found common cause not only with WikiLeaks
founder Julian Assange, but the Occupy movements, and accused leaker
Bradley Manning. Olson also covers the numerous Anonymous’ operations aimed at agencies and institutions such as PayPal, Mastercard, and
Visa, which refused to process payments for websites that were raising
funds for the legal defense of Assange, Manning, and those associated
with Occupy movements.
Particularly revealing in Olson’s book is the notion that the ethos of
the group is also how the group is structured. Information on the Internet
is dispersed and decentralized, as is Anonymous. Marshall McLuhan
proclaimed the “medium is the message”; for hacktivists the medium is
the ethos. The structure of the collective is also a reflection of its ethos.
As a loosely affiliated group of online social activists, Anonymous takes
pride in being unstructured without a hierarchy or central authority. This
nebulous structure has strategic advantages, but operationally, as Olson
covers in her chapter “Civil War,” these characteristics have proven troublesome. Due to Anonymous’s loose structure, any operation can move
forward or be cancelled in a capricious manner. Furthermore, as a collective, members can do more than just dissent against a planned operation
and opt out; they can actively work against the operation by launching
counterattacks against factions with whom they disagree. They can also
prevent members from accessing online fora, where many members find
each other. Internal schisms have occurred among Anonymous members
who wanted to undertake operations in accordance with the hacker
ethos, others who wanted to take on morals-motivated attacks against
organizations that suppress human freedom in the physical world, and
yet others who were purely interested in hacking for “spite and fun.”
Finally, unlike a book written for a
popular audience, an academic work, a
collection of discussions and a journalistic
investigation, The Pirate Organization: Lessons
from the Fringes of Capitalism is an essay written
by Rodolphe Durand and Jean-Philippe
Verne. Although the authors do not focus
exclusively on the cyber domain, they do
discuss the historical struggle between
sovereign actors and those who seek and
exploit ungoverned areas. For them, a
pirate organization,

Boston: Harvard Business School
Publishing Corporation, 2013. 208 pages.
$22.00..

regardless of time, share the following features:
they enter into a conflictive ‘relationship’ with
the state, especially when the state claims to be
the sole source or sovereignty; they operate in
an organized manner, from a set of support
bases located outside this territory, over which

Examining Warfare In Wi-Fi

Kan

117

the state typically claims sovereign control; they develop, as alternative communities, a series of discordant norms that, according to them, should be
used to regulate uncharted territory; and ultimately, they represent a threat
to the state because they upset the very ideas of sovereignty and territory by
contesting the state’s control and the activities of the legal entities that operated under its jurisdiction, such as for-profit corporations and monopolies.
(15)

Given this definition, WikiLeaks and Anonymous fit easily inside the
parameters of a pirate organization. In fact, the authors make it clear
that concentrating solely on contemporary maritime piracy is misplaced.
“Blackbeard, for example, has far more in common with a cyberpirate
than with a Somalian peasant who uses a Kalashnikov to attack a fishing
boat from a makeshift craft” (15). The authors insightfully and succinctly go through the history of pirate organizations—the 17th and
18th century buccaneers, radio DJs at sea, cyberpirates on the Web, and
biopirates in the lab . According to the authors, pirate organizations
emerge because a new, ungoverned territory is ripe for exploitation. As
seen in the four previously reviewed books, cyberspace is the ultimate
ungoverned territory. Hacktivists, as understood through the definition
of a pirate organization, are in some ways more central players in the
cyber domain than nation-states.
Groups like Anonymous and WikiLeaks clearly represent one side
of the tension between sovereignty and stateless actors. Also, the way
the authors set up the tension between such an organization and the
state is a useful tonic for those like Clarke who see hacktivism as a
“fairly mild form of online protest” (55). Those who set their sights on
a cyberwar occurring between nation-states would do well to read this
book to gain a broader perspective on what they are missing from the
larger discussion of cyberwar.
There is plenty to quibble about when it comes to their definition
of pirate organizations, and their glib dismissal of maritime piracy
off the Horn of Africa is a pity; a deeper understanding would show
that it is a more complex activity, which in fact supports their thesis.
Contemporary maritime piracy takes advantage of regional and global
networks of finance, insurance, and shipping that occur far from the
acts of high seas hijacking. The network is dispersed, somewhat durable,
and resilient to detection and elimination.
The five books portray the growing complexity of conceptualizing
malicious online actions. Policymakers, national security professionals,
and scholars often dismiss hacktivists or cyber pirates as collections of
socially awkward malcontents who find a sense of belonging by creating mischief online. Instead, they focus on cyberwar conducted or
supported by nation-states. Placing complicated changes in the security
environment back into the nation-state box is easy, but to do so would be
short-sighted. We have done this before not so long ago and to disastrous
effect. Between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the World Trade
Center, nonstate actors were ignored in favor of state-based challenges.
Even today, after more than a decade of the War on Terror and wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, our grasp on topics like terrorism, insurgency,
and asymmetric war is not completely firm.
Moreover, given the newness of the cyber domain and its rapidly
changing nature, it would be a mistake to disregard any groups who
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have as an ethos the desire to define cyberspace through online acts
that challenge the fundamental elements of national security. This is
especially so if some of those groups feel they are besieged by governments and routinely use the rhetoric of war—“this seemingly platonic
realm of ideas and information flow, could there be a notion of coercive
force? A force that could modify historical records, tap phones, separate people, transform complexity into rubble and erect walls, like an
occupying army?” (3) Policymakers, national security professionals, and
scholars have previously dismissed groups who believe they are acting in
self-defense and who then strike out unexpectedly and in unanticipated
ways only to our surprise and detriment.
What is present in varying degrees throughout the literature about
cyberspace and cyberwar are the five distinct ongoing debates about
this new domain and how to act within it. The debates include who
sets the boundaries of cyberspace; how should online information be
controlled; to whom should information be available; can hierarchies
and networks of people coexist in cyberspace; and what is the difference
between “war” and “crime” in cyberspace.1 In the reviewed books, it
is evident that each cyber attack or cyber assault not only adds to these
debates but helps the cyber domain gain more definition. Paradoxically,
the debates to define cyberspace are occurring via cyberspace.
The paradox will likely become ever more acute with the advancement of cyber technology and the increasingly intertwined nature of the
internet with our daily lives. With the advent of the “wearable web” like
Google Glass, the Apple Iwatch, and even the potential for spray-on
wi-fi, this intertwined nature will become incarnate. We won’t be in
cyberspace; we will be cyberspace. Being prepared for this future makes
these five books essential reading.

1     For a very solid exploration of the debate over what is “war,” “crime,” and “violence” in the
cyber domain, please see the series of articles by John Stone, Gary McGraw, Dale Peterson, Timothy
Junio, Adam Liff, and Thomas Rid in the “Cyber War Roundtable” of the Journal of Strategic Studies
36, no. 1 (February 2013).

